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Property Rights and Investment in Agriculture: Evidence for Ghana 
 
Abstract  
This article develops a theoretical framework to examine the relationship between land 
tenure agreements and households’ investment in land improvement and conservation 
measures. It then analyzes this relationship with a multivariate probit model based on a 
survey data from a sample of 560 plots belonging to 246 farmers from 6 villages in the 
Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana. A major hypothesis tested is that investment in productivity 
enhancing and conservation techniques are influenced by land tenure systems. The 
theoretical analysis and empirical results generally reveal that land tenure differences 
significantly influence farmers’ decisions to invest in land improvement and conservation 
measures. Furthermore, reduced-form productivity regressions show that tenure differences 
do affect land productivity.  
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1. Introduction 
The role of land tenure on investments in productivity enhancing measures in developing 
countries has been widely documented in the economic literature. Particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where land is central to the social and economic development of a vast 
majority of the people, the link between indigenous tenure arrangements and productivity 
enhancing investments has attracted the attention of both researchers and policy makers. 
While studies by Dorner (1972) and Harrison (1987) argued that indigenous tenure systems 
provide insufficient security to induce farmers to undertake land improving investments, 
Noronha (1985) pointed out that these arrangements are dynamic and evolve in line with 
factor prices. The significance of this debate has attracted a great deal of attention among 
economists (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002; Place 
and Otsuka, 2002; Goldstein and Udry, 2008).  
A central issue of the related empirical investigations is the effect of tenure security on 
investment and productivity. On theoretical grounds, three main arguments have been 
advanced for a positive link between tenure security and investment. First, secured property 
rights is expected to provide a guarantee for farmers to undertake long-term investments in 
land-improving and conservation measures, since there would be no fear of expropriation. 
Some authors have even suggested that the lack of secured land rights encourage farmers to 
adopt measures that lead to environmental degradation (e.g., Afikorah-Danquah, 1997).1 
Second, it has been argued that secured land rights make it easier to use land as collateral to 
obtain loans to finance agricultural investments (Feder and Feeny, 1991). The third effect 
operates through better possibilities for trade. As noted by Besley (1995), investment in 
land-improving measures is encouraged if improved transfer rights enhance the factor 
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mobility, making it easier for farmers to sell or rent their land. An issue that has gained 
increasing significance in the recent empirical analysis is the endogeneity of land rights in 
estimating the effect of tenure security on agricultural investment. Authors like Besley 
(1995), Place and Otsuka (2002), Brasselle et al. (2002) have rightly noted that farmers 
may undertake land-improving investments in order to gain tenure security. 
The empirical investigations into the land rights-investment relationship appear to be 
inconclusive. Studies on Africa by Migot-Adholla et al. (1994) and Pinkney and Kimuyu 
(1994) reveal that the impact of land rights on land improving investments and planting of 
tree crops is quite low. On the other hand, work by Carter and Olinto (2003) on Paraguay 
and Besley (1995) on Ghana show that tenure security exerts a positive and significant 
impact on investments. Brasselle et al. (2002) report that land tenure security is influenced 
by investment, and that once the endogeneity bias is properly controlled, increased land 
rights do not appear to stimulate investment. Deiniger et al. (2003) indicate that the effect 
of tenure security on investment differs according to the type of investment and they found 
in their study on Ethiopia that tenure insecurity actually encouraged the planting of trees, 
but discouraged investment in terraces. Place and Otsuka (2002) also found that coffee 
planting is used by farmers to enhance tenure security, supporting the notion that farmers 
consider tenure implications when making investment decisions.  
Most of the studies that have examined the tenure security-investment relationship have 
employed reduced-form specifications–with the notable exception of Besley (1995) and 
Cater and Olinto (2003) – that do not distinguish between the impacts of different tenure 
arrangement on investment decisions. This article contributes to the debate by developing a 
framework that captures the impact of different land tenure arrangements on investment 
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decisions of farmers. The model embodies behavioral assumptions consistent with 
investment decisions that characterize investment in productivity-enhancing inputs in the 
agricultural sectors of most sub-Saharan African countries. First we use a theoretical model 
to examine the effects of 4 different tenancy agreements on investment decisions of 
farmers. We then use variations in tenure agreements between different plots obtained from 
a survey of 246 farmers from 6 villages in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana to analyze the 
impact of property rights on investment in land-improvement and conservation measures. 
The empirical part of the article also examines the relationship between tenure agreements 
and crop productivity. The main contributions of the article reside in the fact that the results 
from the theoretical analysis hold for a wide range of situations and are as such independent 
of case specific data. Moreover, the empirical analysisconsiders a) endogeneity between 
land rights and investment decisions and b) interdependence between the different 
investment decisions.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses land tenure in Ghana. 
In Section 3, we present a theoretical model on soil capital and forest use on plots where 
farmers can undertake short-term and long-term investments in land improvements. In 
Section 4, a multivariate probit model is employed to investigate the probability to invest in 
land improvements on rented and owner-cultivated plots. Section 5 discusses the survey 
data. The empirical results are discussed in Section 6, while the final section presents some 
concluding remarks. 
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2. Land Tenure in Ghana 
As in several other African countries, land is traditionally owned by the community in 
Ghana. Control of the land is transmitted through the elders, who are custodians of land. 
Each herdsman therefore sees to it that all members of his lineage have portions to farm 
(Gildea, 1964). With the development of the cocoa industry in the country, practices of 
landholding have become individual ownership in contrast to family control of segments of 
the community land. Particularly in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions, the procurement 
of large bundles of land by wealthy investors changed the old order. These investors either 
moved into previously unclaimed land or acquired secured rights to community land in 
exchange for money or influence. Some of these large-scale farmers sometimes reside 
somewhere else and supervise the operations on their land (Benneh, 1989). Even among 
migrants, land rights have become more clearly individualized, with members of the family 
qualifying for inheritance of land in the event of the death of the family head (Quisumbing 
et al., 2001). There is a complex system of communally owned land in the rural northern 
regions of the country, with many local variations. Land tenure is generally based on the 
community’s social organization, and the basic unit of ownership is the family or clan.  
Given that full ownership of rights over land traditionally resides with the community, 
one becomes less concerned with overall land tenure security than with rights that the 
individual holds over specific land parcels (Place and Hazell, 1993). We therefore focus on 
the long-term interests farmers have on land parcels, in terms of their rights to cultivate the 
land on continuous basis for long periods of time and their ability to rent or sell the land. As 
argued by Place and Hazell (1993), these features of land control are best captured by 
tenure measures based on the individual use and transfer rights that farmers possess over 
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land. To capture these features, we collected detailed information on individual rights–
basically use rights and transfer rights–for each parcel operated by the farmers in the 
sample.  
Four main types of land tenure arrangements were identified in the survey area. These 
include owner-operated with full property rights, owner-operated with restricted property 
rights, fixed-rent and sharecropping arrangements. The owner-operated with full rights 
involves farmers owning and cultivating their own plots. Farmers cultivating these parcels 
have transfer rights, including rights to sell the parcels, although in some cases family 
approval has to be acquired before the land can be sold. Owner-operated with restricted 
rights involves plots that are acquired as grants, but cannot be transferred or inherited. The 
fixed-rent agreement involves land owners renting out parcels to tenants, who are normally 
migrants from other areas. Under sharecropping contract, an arrangement is made between 
the landlord and the cultivator, such that one-third of the output is given to the landlord as 
compensation for using the land. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
The model presented below analyzes the link between land tenure agreements and 
investment in land improvement and conservation measures within a dynamic framework. 
The previous literature, considers standing forest (Angelsen, 1999, and Babier, 2004) or 
soil capital (Ehui et al., 1990) as a renewable or non-renewable resource. In this article, we 
model soil capital and forest as a renewable resource and analyze their interdependencies 
with agricultural production. It is assumed here that farmers combine investments in both 
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mineral fertilizers, ( )MX t , such as NPK and organic fertilizers, ( )OX t , such as mulch and 
manure where t indicates calendar time. We control for cultivated plots and plots whose 
areas of production have been used for tree planting. Farmers are also assumed to choose 
production methods that improve soil fertility and increase productivity. Although crop 
yields normally increase with higher rates of mineral fertilizer, yields may decline with 
time, if other factors are held constant. The decline in yields may result from soil 
degradation, which then erodes the original purpose of investments. 
Given these potential negative impact of continuous application of mineral fertilizer, 
profit maximizing farmers normally invest in organic fertilizers that naturally replenish 
nutrients in the soil with relatively less cost. The underlying economic reasoning being the 
returns farmers obtain from these investments. Let us assume now that the production 
function is defined for one hectare. Under this assumption, the agricultural production 
function per hectare can be defined as ( ( ), ( ), ( ))M Of S t X t X t , where ( )S t  represents soil 
capital, and ( )MX t  and ( )OX t  are as defined above. The application of organic fertilizers 
augments soil capital according to the function ( ( ))Oh X t , with ( ) 0h′ ⋅ > . Moreover, since 
the soil, mineral and organic fertilizers are close substitutes, we can write function ( )f ⋅ as a 
sum of expressions that reflect individually the effect of ( ), ( ),MS t X t  and ( )OX t . Hence, 
the cross derivatives of the function ( )f ⋅ is zero if there is no multiplicative effect between 
the variables, or it is constant if the multiplicative effect is the product of two variables. The 
volume of the biomass of trees (wood) is given by ( )W t . The farmers have the choice to 
plant young trees, with volume denoted by P(t). The planted trees grow according to the 
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logistic growth function ( ( ))g W t , with ( ) 0g′ ⋅ > . Standing forest increases soil capital 
specified by the function ( ( ))y W t , with ( ) 0y′ ⋅ > , but reduces the acreage that is available 
for agricultural production. This reduction in acreage can be expressed as  ( )W tα  with 
0α > . The size of the entire farm is normalized to one and the share of the land that is used 
for agricultural production is denoted by ( )L t . Under the restriction that 
 0 ( ) 1 ( )L t W tα≤ ≤ − , 0W =  implies that the entire land will be used for crop cultivation, 
whereas 1W α=  implies using the entire land for growing trees.  
Since current decisions tend to affect the evolution of the natural resources over time, 
we analyze the farmer’s decision problem within a dynamic context and take into 
consideration the fact that the planning horizon of the farmer depends on land tenure 
arrangement. We further assume that agricultural households maximize farm net benefits 
subject to agronomic and biophysical constraints (the evolution of the soil and forest) over 
a planning horizon of length T , and the residual value of the trees and soil capital is given 
by ( )( ), ( )r S T W T . The function ( )r ⋅ will be zero for owners with restricted property rights, 
fixed-rent tenants and sharecroppers, because they do not have the possibility to sell the 
land. Given that restricted property rights are usually not limited over time, it is assumed 
that owners with full or with restricted rights have the same long-term perspective2 while 
tenants (fixed-rent or sharecropping) have a planning horizon that corresponds to the 
stipulated tenure duration. Given these assumptions, the farmer’s decision problem can be 
stated as  
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                 ( ) ( ) ( ), ( )
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e ϕ−≡ − − − ⋅
+ − +
∫
            (1) 
subject to 
 0( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ),    with (0) , O M OS t h X t L t y W t f S t X t X t L t S Sδ= + − =&      
             0( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ),    with (0) ,W t g W t C t P t W W= − + =&                                                                                                         
              0 ( ) 1 ( )L t W tα≤ ≤ −  and ( ), ( ), ( ) 0,O MX t X t C t ≥  
where  1 2( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )L L Wp p pf L t p C tθ θβ θβ⋅ = − + ⋅ +
 
represents the cost of the land 
cultivated with agricultural crops and planted trees ,with 0,1θ = . In the case of 
sharecropping 1θ =  and Lp = 1 2( ) ( ) ( ))Wpf L t p C tβ β⋅ + , where 1β  and 2β indicate the share 
of the yields that accrue to the owner of the land.3 In the case of no sharecropping (owner 
and fixed-rent tenant),
 
0θ = , the cost of the land is given by the constant Lp  which, 
however, is not identical for the owner and the tenant.  
The parameters to be considered in the model are p = price of the cultivated crop, Mp = 
price of mineral fertilizer, Op = price of organic fertilizer, Wp = price of the wood minus the 
logging and transportation cost, Pp  = price of the seedlings of the trees and its plantation,  
δ = degradation of the soil capital, and ϕ  = discount rate. 
To simplify the notation we suppress the argument t  of the variables as well as those of 
the costate variables and Lagrange multipliers to be introduced later, and define the current 
value Lagrangian L  by 
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+ + + + + + −
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(2)  
where Sλ  and Wλ  are the corresponding costate variables, 1µ  and 2µ
 
are Lagrange 
multipliers associated with restrictions related to the availability of land, and 1ξ  to 4ξ  are 
Lagrange multipliers related to the non-negativity of the control variables. The first order 
conditions are given by 
( )1 1 2 0M M O O Spf p X p X pf h fL θβ λ δ µ µ
∂
= − − − + − + − =
∂
L
             
(3) 
( )1 1( ) 0M MX M S X
M
pf p p f L
X
θβ λ δ ξ∂ = − − + + =
∂
L
               
(4) 
( )( )1 2 0O O OX O X S X
O
pf p pf h f L
X
θβ λ δ ξ∂ ′= − − + − + =
∂
L
              
(5) 
3 0P WpP
λ ξ∂ = − + + =
∂
L
                  
(6) 
2 ´ 4(1 ) 0W WpC θβ ξ λ
∂
= − + − =
∂
L
                 
(7) 
( )1( )S S S Sp p f Lλ ϕλ θβ λ δ= − − −&
                 
(8) 
2 ( ).W W S Wy g Wλ ϕλ αµ λ λ′ ′= + − −&
                 
(9) 
For an interior solution, 1( 0)ξ = , the solution of equation (4) is presented in figure 1.4 
Owners of land with secured tenure will consider the shadow cost of the soil ( Sλ ), whereas 
tenants or sharecroppers will not consider these costs. Hence, fixed-rent tenants apply T eMX , 
sharecroppers SMX , and owners 
O
MX . While it is clear from figure 1 that tenants apply more 
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mineral fertilizer than owners, a direct comparison between sharecroppers and owners is 
not possible in the analysis. The behavior of sharecroppers will depend on the value of 1β . 
In the case that the owner chooses 1 S pβ λ δ=  owner and sharecropper will tend to apply 
the same amount of mineral fertilizer.  
The optimal amount of organic fertilizer, which can be derived from an interior solution 
of equation (5) is presented in figure 2. Given that owners take into consideration the 
shadow cost of the soil ( Sλ ), they apply more organic fertilizer than a tenant, provided that 
the soil improvement effect of organic fertilizer, h′ , is greater than the soil degradation 
effect (
OX
fδ ) of the cultivation. This situation is depicted in figure 2 by comparing TeOX
 
with OOX% . It is however significant to note that tenants may apply more organic fertilizers 
than owners under specific conditions. Such a situation may arise if the soil improvement 
effect of organic fertilizer is lower than the soil degradation effect, as depicted in figure 2, 
which compares TeOX  with 
O
OX . According to figure 2, sharecroppers apply less organic 
fertilizer, SOX , than fixed-rent tenants. A direct comparison between sharecroppers and 
owners is however not possible. If the share that corresponds to the landlord is equal to 
0
S
x
h
p f
λ δ
 ′−
+  
 
, owners and sharecroppers apply the same amount of organic fertilizer. 
Condition (6) indicates that it is optimal to plant young trees if their in-situ value, Wl , 
is equal to their planting cost. Otherwise, 3x  presents the difference between planting cost 
and in-situ value of the young trees, and it is optimal to plant no trees. Cutting of trees 
results in 0C >
, 
and therefore 4 0ξ =  in equation (7). Hence, for tenants and owners, the 
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unit price of wood needs to be equal to the in-situ value of the standing trees, while an 
additional 2 Wpb  has to be subtracted from the net price of wood for sharecroppers. If the 
net price minus 2 Wpqb  is not equal to the in-situ value, the difference will be reflected in 
the value of 4ξ . It is also evident in equation (7) that for cases where 0C >  that Wλ  is 
equal to 2(1 )Wp θβ− , indicating that Wλ  is a constant, and therefore 0Wλ =& . This condition 
holds outside the steady state equilibrium where farmers cut trees. Moreover, the condition 
0Wλ =&  holds at the steady state equilibrium by definition. Hence, the following discussion 
holds for the two described situations. In this case, utilizing the definition of Wλ
 
in equation 
(7), equation (9) can be written as:  
( ) 2 20 ( ) (1 )    ( ).W Sg W p y Wϕ θβ αµ λ′ ′= − − + −
             
(10) 
Let us assume for now that 0y′ = and the farmer leaves some land fallow, i.e.,. 02 =µ since 
the opportunity cost for land is zero. It corresponds to the case where some of the land is 
used neither for agriculture nor for trees. Thus, equation (10) reduces to 
( ) 20 ( ) (1 ) .Wg W pϕ θβ′= − −
                
(11) 
Equation (11) holds if we choose W  such that ( )g W′
 
is equal to ϕ , in which case the 
marginal growth rate of the biomass will be equal to the discount rate. This case is depicted 
in figure 3 for *W W= , a result that is standard in natural resource economics, since the 
optimal stock is to the left of the maximum sustainable yield, MSYW . 
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However, if the entire agricultural land is cultivated and 0y′ ≠ , the term 2µ  defines the 
quasi rent of the land which, according to equation (3), is given by 
( )2 1 .M M O O Spf p X p X pf h fµ θβ λ δ= − − − + −  
Hence, the optimal W  for owners is given by 
20 ( )  
  ( )
S
W
w W
M M O O S W
W
yg W p
p p
yg W pf p X p X h f p
p
αµ λϕ
αϕ λ δ
α
 ′
′= − + − 
 
 ′  
′= − + − − + − −   
   
          (12) 
and for sharecroppers and tenants by 
( )
2
2
2
1 2
2
0 ( )+ (1 )  (1 )
  ( ) (1 ) .(1 )
W
W
M M O O W
W
g W p
p
g W pf p X p X pf p
p
αµϕ θβ
θβ
αϕ θβ θβ
θβ
 
′= − − 
− 
 
′= − + − − − − 
− 
         (13)
 
It needs to be noted that the optimal W  cannot be unambiguously determined from 
equations (12) and (13), since the term 2µ  is not identical for the different tenure regimes. 
Hence, the graphical solution of equations (12) and (13) can only be obtained under the 
assumption that the differences in 2µ  are relatively small and do not alter the ranking of the 
optimal W  for the different tenure regimes. The empirical analysis undertaken with 
primary data addresses the situation where the above assumption is not applicable. 
Provided that the term 2µ  is relatively small, figure 3 shows that the opportunity to 
cultivate fallow land leads in the case of a tenant to a decrease in W , from *W  to TeW . 
Likewise, we observe in the case of an owner that the optimal W  decreases from *W  to 
OW%  or OW . However, it cannot be determined whether the decrease of the owner is below 
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or above the optimal W  of the tenant, TeW . Similarly, we have to leave the determination 
of the optimal W  of the sharecropper for the empirical part of the paper. 
The foregoing analysis has considered the case where trees are cut, 0C > . In the 
specific case where 0C =  we know from the relationship ( )W g W C P′= − +& , that W  is 
defined by ( ) ( )dW g W dW g W dt
dt
′ ′= = =∫ ∫ , in which case 
0
( ) ( )
t
OW t W g W dt′= + ∫ . Trees 
grow during this phase without being cut.  
 
4. Estimation Specification  
The first order conditions (4) – (9) imply that farmers invest in land-improving or 
conservation measures if it leads to an increase in the aggregated expected net benefit over 
the planning horizon. However, the expected net benefit is not observable, since it is 
subjective. What is observed is the decision to invest or not to invest, i.e. the planting of 
trees, application of mineral fertilizer, as well as organic fertilizer such as mulch and 
organic manure. The empirical analysis focuses on the factors that influence the likelihood 
of farmers engaging in these investments. In line with the maximization problem outlined 
in equation (1), farmers invest in soil improvement and natural resource management 
measures, if the net benefit from the investment is positive, that is, if the value of J is 
greater than zero. As indicated earlier, changes in J are not observable, but can be 
expressed as a function of observable elements. Let us define the underlying latent 
propensity variable for investment in each of the four soil improvement and natural 
resource management strategies as *hJ . The underlying propensities can then be related to 
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the plot’s observed characteristics and farmer related variables, hZ , and unobserved 
characteristics, hε , in the following latent variable model:  
*
h h h hJ Z β ε′= +   (h = Trees, Fertilizer, Mulching, Organic Manure)          (14) 
where h is used to index the four different investment options in soil improvement and 
natural resource management measures. Variables in iZ  include tenure security, household 
characteristics such as age, sex, and years of formal schooling of farmer, access to credit, as 
well as plot-specific characteristics such as plot size, distance of plot from home and 
geographic location. Denoting trees, fertilizer, mulching and organic manure as T, F, M, 
and O, respectively, equation (14) can simply be transformed into a binary probit equation 
for participation for each investment option under the following mapping from the latent 
variable to its observed realization: 
), (        
0.  if  0
0;  if   1
*
*
OT, F, Mh 
J
J
J
h
h
h =




≤
>
=               (15) 
Let’s assume that O)MFThh ,,,( =ε  jointly follow a multivariate normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance 1, and the covariance matrix Σ .5 This can be expressed as 
( , , , ) ~ (0, ),T F M O MVNε ε ε ε ′ Σ  where 
∑












=
1
1
1
1
OMOFTO
MOMFTM
FOFMTF
TOTMTF
ρρρ
ρρρ
ρρρ
ρρρ
 
Maximum likelihood method can then be employed to estimate the parameters and the four 
correlations of the error terms (Greene, 2008). However, because the probabilities that enter 
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the likelihood are functions of high dimensional multivariate normal distributions, they are 
simulated using GHK algorithm (Greene, 2008, p. 582). Other studies on investments in 
soil improvement and natural resource management measures have employed single-
equation techniques, with the assumption that hε  independently follows univariate 
distributions with )   ; and , (   ,0 ihO MT, Fh,ihi ≠==ρ .6 However, because of the 
substitutability or complementarity between these investment options, and the fact that the 
plots in the sample are similar across equations, it is most likely that the error terms of these 
equations will be correlated. 
As indicated earlier, tenure security might be influenced by investment, resulting in 
endogeneity of the tenure variables in the multivariate probit model. When the dependent 
variable is discrete, the usual two-stage least square method will not be able to address the 
endogeneity problem.7 Woodridge (2002) argues that the most useful two-step approach to 
examine endogeneity in a probit model is the one proposed by Rivers and Vuong (1988). 
To illustrate this approach which is termed Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
(2SCML), rewrite equation (14) in the form 
*
h h h h h hJ R Yβ γ µ′ ′= + +   (h = T, F, M, O)             (16)                                                               
where hR′  is a vector of exogenous variables and hY ′  is a vector of potentially endogenous 
variables. In the present paper, owner-operated with full property rights, fixed-rent and 
sharecropping are the tenure agreement variables, with owner-operated with restricted 
property rights used as the base variable. The 2SCML approach involves estimating each 
variable in the vector  hY ′  with least squares and then including the predicted values, ˆhV ′ , 
from the regression in the specification below 
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*
ˆ
h h h h h h h hJ R Y Vβ γ δ µ′ ′ ′= + + +   . (h = T, F, M, O)            (17) 
The probit estimates of hγ  in equation (17) are consistent (Blundell and Smith, 1989; 
Wooldrige, 2002).8 A significant feature of the approach is that the usual probit t-statistics 
on hδ  are valid tests of the null hypotheses that the variables are exogenous.9 A linear 
probability model is employed in the first-stage estimation of the four tenure rights 
variables. The predicted values from the first-stage estimations are then included in the 
multivariate probit specifications and estimated with simulated maximum likelihood.10 To 
ensure identification in the estimation of the probit model, some of the variables included in 
the first-stage estimation of tenure rights are excluded in the investment specification. 
Specifically, ethnicity and non-labor income which were included as variables in the tenure 
rights equation were deleted from the investment specification. The overidentication test 
statistic suggested by Lee (1992) is employed to test the validity of the excluded 
instruments.11  
For each plot, tenure right is represented by four categories that include owner-operated 
with transfer rights, fixed-rent and sharecropping contracts, as well as owner-operated with 
restricted rights. Farm implements are used to capture wealth status. In addition to the 
tenure dummies and wealth variables, distance of plot from home, household size, 
education of household head, sex of household head, farm size, and soil fertility are 
included in the models to capture their effects on probability to invest in land improvement 
measures. Since investment is a trade off between current consumption opportunities for 
increased future consumption, we combine in each estimation, 4 different set of choice 
alternatives that do not provide similar effects. The investment options considered include 
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tree planting, mineral fertilizer, mulching and organic manure. As indicated in the 
theoretical analysis, the magnitude of the influence of different tenure agreements on  
investment decisions of farmers, as well as the sign of the influence on some investment 
decisions cannot be determined a priori, and therefore needs to be determined empirically, 
which is done below. 
 
5. Data and Definition of Variables 
The data used in the analysis were collected during January and October 2003 in six 
villages in two districts–Techiman and Nkoranza–in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana. A 
stratified random sample of 246 farm households with 560 plots was selected from four 
villages in Techiman District and two villages in Nkoranza District. The locations sampled 
in Techiman include Twimea-Nkwanta, Aworopata, Woraso and Nkwaeso. In Nkoranza 
District, Dromankese and Ayerede were sampled. The sample was taken to ensure 
representation of the various land tenure arrangements in the area. Specifically, it consisted 
of 65 owner-cultivated households with 214 plots, while the remaining 346 plots were 
cultivated under sharecropping or fixed-rent contracts by 181 farm households. As 
indicated earlier, the productivity-enhancing investments undertaken by farmers included 
mulching, mineral fertilizer, organic manure and planting of trees such as orange, mango, 
teak and indigenous trees. 
Information on household characteristics, such as number of years of schooling and age 
of farmer, as well as the sex of farmer were included. As noted by Barrett et al. (2002), 
improved natural resource management practices such as mulching and manure preparation 
and application are knowledge-intensive and require considerable management input. In 
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particular, formal schooling may enhance latent managerial ability and greater cognitive 
capacity. The other data included number of implements owned by farmer, livestock value 
and access to credit. In many developing countries, incomplete information between 
lenders and borrowers and uncertain conditions in agriculture and financial markets lead to 
imperfections in the credit market, including credit constraints that affect investment 
decisions. However, it might be misleading to classify farmers as credit-constrained simply 
because they did not use any credit. Hence, farmers were classified as liquidity-constrained 
if (1) they already had credit but expressed interest in borrowing more at the prevailing 
interest rate and (2) if credit was unavailable because their request was rejected, or there 
was no access to formal or informal lenders. 
Differences across plots in term of quality and location also affect the suitability of the 
plots for various investments. Information on plot characteristics was therefore collected to 
address this issue. The plot-level characteristics gathered include distance of plot from 
home, and whether plot is fertile or not. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the analysis are provided in Table 1. The incidence of investment is measured by dummy 
variables that take on the value of one when a household has undertaken a particular 
investment and zero when no investment has taken place. Four variables are employed in 
the study to examine tenure security. These include owner-operated with full rights, owner-
operated with restricted rights, fixed-rent cultivation and sharecropping contract. All these 
variables are measured with dummy variables. The average tenure duration on fixed-rent 
plots in the sampled area is about 2 years.  
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6. Empirical Results 
The empirical results for investment in land improvement measures are presented in Table 
2. Four investment alternatives are considered in the estimation. These include tree 
planting, which is a long-term investment option, as well as mineral fertilizer, mulching, 
and organic manure, which are largely considered as short-term land improvement 
alternatives. The estimated correlation coefficients are all positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level of significance, indicating that unobserved variables 
involved in each investment option are significantly positively related, and confirms that it 
is more efficient to model the investment in all four options jointly rather than separately. 
The overidentification tests statistics for the validity of the instruments failed to reject 
exclusion of the instruments used in the estimations, indicating consistency of the 
estimates.12  
The variable representing owner-operated with rights is positive and significantly 
different from zero in all four investment options, suggesting that land rights matter for 
investments. It is significant to note that these results confirm our theoretical findings 
where we showed that owners apply more organic fertilizer in the form of manure and 
mulching ( OOX
~
 in figure 2) than sharecroppers and fixed-rent tenants, if the soil 
improvement effect is greater than the soil degradation effect of organic fertilizer. 
Likewise, the empirical analysis supports our theoretical finding that owners plant more 
trees ( OW~  in figure 3) than fixed-rent tenants. The theoretical and empirical results also 
indicate that owner-operated with rights do invest less in mineral fertilizer than fixed-rent 
tenants (figure 1) while the behavior of the sharecroppers cannot be determined 
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unambiguously.13 The positive and significant impact of tenure rights on investment is in 
line with the results reported by Besley (1995), but contrasts with the findings by 
Quisumbing et al. (2001), who rather found in their study that the incidence of tree-planting 
and field management are unaffected by land tenure regimes in Ghana. .  
The variable for sharecropping is also positive in all four specifications, but significant 
for only organic manure. The findings here clearly show that owner-operated with full 
rights are more likely to invest in these activities than sharecroppers. This result is 
consistent with the Marshallian disincentive theory on sharecropping contracts which 
stipulates that incentives for cultivators to invest in yield-enhancing inputs is much lower, 
since they receive only part of the benefits (Shaban, 1987). Consistent with the theoretical 
analysis, the variable for fixed-rent is negative and significant for trees, mulch and organic 
manure, but positive and significant for inorganic fertilizer. This indicates that relative to 
owners, plots on fixed-rent contracts are less likely to attract investment in trees, mulching 
and organic manure, but are more likely to attract investment in inorganic fertilizer for 
short-term benefits.  
Trees are more likely to be planted by farmers with higher education, more assets, and 
larger plot sizes. In particular, education appears to have a positive and significant impact 
on all the four investment options, a finding that is in line with the human capital theory. 
According to the theory, farmers with more schooling and information will be better 
informed about the performance of different yield-enhancing technologies and will be more 
likely to make efficient investment decisions (Huffman, 2001). 
Distance of the plot from home appears to influence investments in tree planting and 
mulching, with a negative and significant coefficient for tree planting and positive for 
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application of mulch. Thus, controlling for tenure arrangements and other farmer’s and 
plot-level characteristics, plots closer to the residence of the household are more likely to 
be used for tree planting than those farther away, while mulch is more likely to be applied 
on plots that are farther away from home. Older farmers appear to be less likely to invest in 
trees. This is probably because younger farmers have more periods in which to benefit from 
making a profitable investment in soil improvement measures that lead to long-term 
benefits. In particular, if farmers are not credit constrained and take future generations into 
account, younger farmers will be more likely to invest in conservation measures than older 
ones.  
Almost all the village dummies are significantly different from zero, indicating 
significant cluster effects, and probably revealing agroclimatic variation and access to 
infrastructure.14 As noted by Besley (1995), they could also be representing village-level 
variation in tenure arrangements. Noteworthy is the statistical significance of all the 
variables representing the residuals derived from the first-stage regressions for tenure 
agreements, indicating that the variables are exogenous and the coefficients have been 
consistently estimated. 
Results of the reduced-form regression on plot-level productivity are presented in Table 
3. Given the significant diversity of crops and intercrops on the plots, we employed value 
of crop output per acre as the dependent variable (Place and Hazell, 1993; Place and 
Otsuka, 2002). Separate analysis for each cropping pattern was not undertaken because of 
the relatively small sample sizes that arise from the data set. Dummy variables for cropping 
patterns were however introduced in the regression to capture the effects of the individual 
crops. 
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Given the potential endogeneity of the access to credit variable, it was instrumented by 
first estimating a probit model of determinants of access to credit and then using the 
predicted values in the productivity estimation. This is because in some cases, land or a 
crop itself can be used as collateral to obtain credit. The results from this first-stage 
regression are presented in Appendix A.15 The estimates in Table 3 indicate a positive and 
statistically significant effect of the ownership variable, suggesting that ownership of land 
results in higher output. This finding is in line with the results by Migot Adholla et al. 
(1991), who found a positive and significant impact of land rights on agricultural 
productivity in Rwanda.16 It is, however, in contrast with the findings reported by Place and 
Hazell (1993) and Place and Otsuka (2002) who found no significant relationship between 
tenure and productivity of crop farming in their studies. 
 The fixed-rent variable also showed a positive sign, but is not significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels, while the sharecropping variable is negative, but not 
significant. It is significant to note that the investments considered are either land-
conserving or productivity enhancing inputs, and ownership tends to positively influence 
investment in these productivity enhancing measures. The results also indicate positive and 
statistically significant effects of access to credit and extension services. Plots farther away, 
as well as those planted with crops such as cassava, beans and plantain also indicate 
positive and significant effects on productivity. As is evident in Appendix A, which 
presents the probit results of determinants of access to credit, a positive and significant 
relationship is found between owner-operated with rights and access to credit. This 
indicates that individualized rights like ownership do necessarily help in securing formal or 
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informal credit, a finding that lends support to the notion that secured land rights make it 
easier to use land as collateral to obtain loans to finance agricultural investments. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This article developed a framework to examine the relationship between different land 
tenure agreements and households’ investment in land improvement and conservation 
measures in the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana. The land tenure agreements considered 
include owner-operated with full property rights, owner-operated with restricted rights, 
fixed-rent agreement, and sharecropping contract. Variations in tenure agreements between 
different plots were used to estimate plot-level regressions relating tenure agreement to 
investments in tree planting, mulching, organic manure as well as inorganic fertilizer 
application. The impact of tenure security on crop productivity was also analyzed using 
reduced-form productivity equations.  
 The empirical results support our theoretical findings and show that better land rights 
tend to facilitate investment in soil improvement and natural resource management 
practices. In particular, farmers who owned land with secured tenure were more likely to 
invest in tree planting, mulching, organic manure, as well as mineral fertilizer. Farmers on 
fixed-term contracts were also found to be likely to attract investments in yield increasing 
inputs such as inorganic fertilizers, but are less likely to invest in tree planting, mulching 
and organic manure. These findings tend to support the widely held view that farmers with 
short-term fixed-rent contracts have little incentives to invest in long-term soil 
improvement measures, but are more interested in reaping the benefits from short-term 
measures. An examination of the impact of tenure rights on productivity, using reduced-
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form equations showed a positive and significant effect of land ownership on crop 
productivity. Access to credit was also found to positively influence crop productivity. 
 The major policy implication of these findings is that, ensuring tenure agreements that 
confer rights to cultivators would enhance investment in both soil improvement and natural 
resource management practices. In addition, the results provide productivity-based 
arguments for enhancing farmers’ access to capital. Thus, policies and programs that 
improve farmers’ access to credit would encourage productive allocation of resources and 
increased production.  
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Fig. 1. The optimal amount of mineral fertilizer. 
 
 
 
MX
pf
1 (sharecropper)MM Xp pfβ+  
(fixed-rent tenant)Mp  
MX  
             
0
MX  
           
     
Te
MX  
       
     
S
MX  
       
(owner)
MM S X
p fλ δ+  
 30
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The optimal amount of organic fertilizer. 
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Fig. 3. The optimal “number of trees” in the presence of agricultural production. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression models 
Variable Definition of variables Mean S.d
Dependent variables    
TREES 1 if farmer plants trees 0.43 0.50 
FERT 1 if farmer applies fertilizer 0.42 0.49 
MULCH 1 if farmer applies mulch 0.35 0.48 
MANURE 1 if farmer applies organic manure 0.14 0.34 
YIELD Output per acre (¢ x 10-6) 0.48 0.25 
Tenure variables    
OWNER 1 if land is under own-operated with rights 0.36 0.48 
FIXRENT 1 if land is under fixed-rent contract 0.28 0.45 
SHARECROP 1 if land is under sharecropping contract 0.17 0.38 
OTHER 1 if land is under owner without rights 0.19 0.26 
Household characteristics   
AGE Age of farmer (years) 49.98 13.67 
EDUCN Years of formal education of farmer 3.76 4.88 
LIVEST  † Value of livestock wealth (¢ x 10-6) 11.20 26.11 
SEX If farmer is a male 1.05 0.22 
IMPLTS Number of implements owned by farmer 13.47 8.78 
EXTEN If farmer received extension visit 0.38 0.49 
CREDIT If farmer has access to credit 0.64 0.48 
Plot characteristics   
PLTDIST Distance of plot from home (km) 2.33 1.91 
FSIZE Farm size (acres) 2.94 2.03 
PLOTFERT 1 if plot is on fertile land 0.14 0.35 
Crops    
PLANTAIN If farmer cultivates plantain on plot 0.09 0.29 
CASSAVA If farmer cultivates cassava on plot 0.06 0.24 
VBEANS If farmer cultivates beans on plot 0.46 0.49 
LEGUME If farmer cultivates beans and groundnuts 0.41 0.49 
Location dummies   
TWIMEA 1 if farmer resides at Twimea-Nkwanta 0.22 0.41 
AWOROPAT 1 if farmer resides at Aworopata 0.13 0.34 
WORASO 1 if farmer resides at Woraso 0.18 0.38 
AYEREDE 1 if farmer resides at Ayerede 0.27 0.44 
DROMA 1 if farmer resides at Dromankese 0.08 0.28 
Note: The dependent variable is a discrete choice variable =1 if investment is undertaken on a plot  
          and 0 otherwise. Exchange rate: US $1=¢8500 in 2003. ¢=Ghanaian Cedis. 
             †
 Represents estimated variables in the regression models. 
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Table 2  
Multivariate Probit Regression of Investment in Land Improvement Measures 
VARIABLE TREES MULCH FERTILIZER MANURE 
CONSTANT     -2.6968***      -1.2350*      -1.2849***        -1.371* 
 
(-4.28) (-1.65) (-2.44) (-1.85) 
OWNER 0.7954*** 0.7135*** 0.1271** 0.2792** 
 
(4.26) (2.89) (2.06) (2.33) 
SHARECROP 0.2725 0.1325 0.0579 0.1291* 
 
(1.32) (1.087) (0.92) (1.78) 
FIXRENT -2.374*** -0.4505*** 0.2884** -0.3761* 
 
(-10.36) (-2.36) (2.31) (-1.71) 
PLTDIST -0.0585* 0.0103* -0.0053 -0.0551 
 
(-1.89) (1.76) (-0.15) (-1.06) 
FSIZE 0.031** -0.0219 0.1067*** -0.1188** 
 
(2.17) (-0.58) (2.69) (-2.10) 
PLOTFERT 0.09 0.7866*** -0.1586 0.8984*** 
 
(0.34) (3.15) (-0.74) (2.80) 
SEX -0.4876 -0.9764** 0.3264 -0.311 
 
(-1.46) (-2.10) (1.04) (-0.64) 
AGE -0.0502*** 0.0086 0.0052 0.0166 
 
(-4.53) (0.86) (0.56) (1.34) 
EDUCN 0.0957*** 0.0529*** 0.0277* 0.0056* 
 
(4.55) (2.73) (1.84) (1.88) 
HHSIZE 0.0171 -0.0276 -0.0252 0.0199 
 
(0.64) (-1.20) (-1.12) (0.75) 
LIVEST -0.0058 -0.0021 0.0048* 0.0118*** 
 
(-1.11) (-0.03) (1.79) (2.62) 
IMPLTS 0.5119*** 0.0177 0.565* 0.3182 
 
(3.89) (0.16) (1.81) (1.56) 
TWIMEA -0.2047 0.2247*** 0.1468 0.7554 
 
(-0.62) (4.94) (0.55) (2.37) 
WORASO 0.5229* 0.238 0.3725 -0.5085 
 
(1.65) (0.49) (1.48) (-0.16) 
AWOROPAT 0.265 0.5863*** 0.5108* -0.0421 
 
(0.81) (3.46) (1.89) (-0.12) 
AYEREDE 0.219 0.2283*** 0.9834*** 0.0971 
 
(0.69) (5.13) (3.98) (0.31) 
DROMA -0.0824 0.1037** 0.0892 -0.3091 
 
(-0.21) (2.08) (1.5) (-1.07) 
RESOWNER 0.173** 0.0132*** 0.057* 0.0931** 
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(2.28) (2.87) (1.93) (2.36) 
RESFIXED 0.0335** 0.0147** 0.0248** 0.0412*** 
 
(2.06) (2.19) (2.32) (3.09) 
RESSHARE 0.132** 0.0872** 0.0615** 0.1173** 
 
(2.31) (2.08) (2.42) (2.16) 
Overidentification    
2χ -statistic 
(p-value) 
     0.72  
    (0.49) 
       0.47  
      (0.36) 
0.58  
(0.41) 
0.63  
(0.44) 
Cross-equation correlations    
TFρ         0.216**   
FMρ   0.234***   
TMρ   0.307***   
TOρ   0.419***   
FOρ   0.208***   
MOρ   0.332***   
Mc Fadden R2   0.249     
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. RESOWNER, RESFIXED and RESSHARE denote  
          the residuals from the first stage regressions for owner cultivation, fixed-rent and 
          sharecropping contracts respectively. 
    ***Denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, * denotes significant at 10% 
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Table 3  
OLS Regression Results Showing the Determinants of Productivity at Plot Level 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t-VALUE 
CONSTANT   1.1709***   4.89  
OWNER   0.5068**   2.55  
FIXRENT  0.4221   1.26  
SHARECROP  -0.0069   -1.04  
PLTDIST   0.0511*   2.24  
FSIZE  -0.2619   -1.23  
PLOTFERT   0.0790*   1.86  
EXTEN    0.3270***   2.71  
PLANTAIN   0.1949**   2.15  
CASSAVA   0.4972***   2.49  
VBEANS   0.4176***   3.08  
LIVEST  0.0256   0.3  
HHSIZE   0.0194*   1.81  
AGE  -0.0103*   -1.69  
PCREDIT a    0.8652**   2.19  
TWIMEA  -1.0349***   -5.51  
WORASO  -0.1760   -0.98  
AWOROPAT  -0.2869   -1.39  
AYEREDE  -0.1461   -0.82  
DROMA  -0.0331   -0.15  
Adjusted R2   0.259    
2χ -statistic for 
Overidentification 
(p-value) 
  
0.382 
(0.49) 
   
Number of 
observations     
560 
      
Note: a Predicted values of credit used in the estimation. Overidentification test statistic for    
            instruments given in the table. 
         *** Denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%,* denotes significant at  
           10%. 
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Appendix A. Probit Estimates of Determinants of Access to Credit 
 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT t-VALUE 
CONSTANT   0.73937***    6.45  
OWNER   0.01876**    2.27  
FIXRENT  -0.00263   -0.04  
SHARECROP  -0.00449   -1.04  
FSIZE   0.00075    1.40  
PLTDIST  -0.20254   -1.53  
PLOTFERT   0.00092    0.06  
HHSIZE   0.01655**    2.32  
EDUCN   0.02423***    4.86  
AGE  -0.00159   -0.90  
SEX   0.03017    1.42  
ETHNIC   0.01075**    2.57  
EXTEN   0.05412    1.13  
LEGUME  -0.04979   -1.16  
TWIMEA  -0.22047***   -2.79  
WORASO  -0.14682**   -2.02  
AWOROPAT     0.20183***    2.36  
AYEREDE   0.02705    0.37  
DROMA  -0.12735   -1.37  
Log-likelihood ratio  126.05    
Pseudo R2   0.386    
Number of observations   560       
Note: *** Denotes significant at 1%, ** denotes significant at 5%, * denotes significant at  
                10%. 
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Notes 
 
 
                                                 
1
 They have argued that farmers without secured rights engage in slash and burn practices 
to save time and cash, cut many trees with the view that land tends to be less productive 
under shady conditions, and also stump to make way for construction of mounds and 
ridges.  
2
 Since the time perspective of owner-operated is independent of type of property right, we 
simply use the term owner in the theoretical section of the article to refer to both types of 
owners. 
3
 Inherent to sharecropping is the question of sharing the risk between the landlord and the 
farmer. However, as we concentrate on the issue of different tenure regimes we use 
expected values and do not analyze the variation in crop yields.  
4
 Since the cross derivatives of f are zero or constant we can graph X Mpf independently 
from the tenure regime although the values of the argument of f vary with the tenure 
regime.  
5
 As pointed out by Greene (2008), the magnitude of the variance of the disturbance term 
cannot be identified for each probit equation, as such the variance has normally been 
assumed as 1.  
6
 For example, Marenya and Barrett (2007) employed single probit models for the 
investment options in their study on Western Kenya.  
7
 The non-linearity of the probit model will result in estimates of standard errors that are 
downward-biased and coefficients that are not normally distributed (Wooldridge, 2002).  
8
 Rivers and Vuong (1988) point out that the usual probit standard errors and test statistics 
are not strictly valid if the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the variable is rejected. In such 
a case, they suggest the use of an M-estimator to derive the asymptotic variance of the two-
step estimator.  
9
 The exogeneity test is similar to a Hausman (1978) test for exogeneity in that the 
parameter hδ  is an estimate of the difference between the parameter hγ  and the 
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corresponding probit estimate of hγ  in which tenure rights enter exogenously, e.g., hγ  in 
equation (18) without the hVδˆ  term (DeSimone, 2002).  
10
 Brasselle et al. (2002) also employed the 2SMCL in their study on Burkina Faso, while 
DeSimone (2002) employed the framework in his study on drug use and employment in the 
United States. Besley (1995) employed the linear probability model to estimate the 
investment specification in his study.  
11
 Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) explain that this statistic tests the joint hypothesis that 
the excluded instruments are not appropriately excluded and are uncorrelated with the error 
term in the investment specification.  
12
 A Jacque-Bera test of conditional normality of the residuals in the multivariate probit 
model could not reject the hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed. The results 
are not presented in the interest of brevity, but are available upon request from the authors. 
13
 The magnitude of the coefficients and the marginal effects support this assertion.  
14
 The joint test of the null hypothesis that all district effects are equal using a likelihood 
ratio test gives a sample chi-squared value of 75.65 and a critical value at the 1% level of 
15.1.  
15
 As the results in Appendix A shows, some of the variables in the credit model were not 
included in the productivity model, thus leading to identification of the productivity model.  
16
 Goldstein and Udry (2008) show in their recent study in the Akwapim district in Ghana 
how a great deal of potential output is lost because land tenure is insecure.  
